Strike Three: Umpires' Demand for Discrimination * We explore how umpires' racial/ethnic preferences are expressed in their evaluation of Major League Baseball pitchers. Controlling for umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher fixed effects and many other factors, strikes are more likely to be called if the umpire and pitcher match race/ethnicity. This effect only exists where there is little scrutiny of umpires' behavior -in ballparks without computerized systems monitoring umpires' calls, at poorly attended games, and when the called pitch cannot determine the outcome of the at-bat. If a pitcher shares the home-plate umpire's race/ethnicity, he gives up fewer hits, strikes out more batters, and improves his team's chance of winning. The general implication is that standard measures of salary discrimination that adjust for measured productivity may be flawed. We derive the magnitude of the bias generally and apply it to several examples.
I. Introduction
Discrimination in the labor market can take many forms, including disparities in wages, promotion, hiring, or performance evaluation. Of these, the last is particularly troubling to economists because it distorts the benchmark: if workers are discriminated against when their performance is evaluated, then standard tests of discrimination will lack power. To see this, consider two co-workers A and B who perform a job where productivity is determined subjectively. The workers have the same true productivity, but due to discrimination by the evaluator, worker A's measured productivity is biased downward. An econometrician observing similar ratios of wages to measured productivity between the two workers would incorrectly dismiss discrimination when in fact it exists.
In this study we show how evaluators' preferences-in this case, for workers who share their race or ethnicity-can create a wedge between measured and actual productivity. To do this, we take advantage of a unique setting involving Major League Baseball (MLB) umpires evaluating the performance of pitchers. In certain situations, umpires have strong incentives to make objectively correct calls, while in others, such incentives are much weaker, allowing umpires' subjective biases to influence their evaluations. This distinction opens up two doors at once. It allows us to quantify directly how racial bias influences subjective performance evaluations, both in the games we study and in the labor market for baseball players.
Additionally, it also provides a sharp test of incentive effects. We show that, although biased player evaluations can impact several aspects of the game, often in surprising ways, the bias can be mitigated by increasing the cost for umpires to express such bias.
We collect and analyze every pitch from three complete baseball seasons (2004) (2005) (2006) , paying particular attention to the race/ethnicity of the umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher. Our results are consistent with racial/ethnic bias influencing umpires' subjective performance evaluations. Specifically, pitchers who share the race/ethnicity of the home-plate umpire receive favorable treatment, as indicated by a higher probability that a pitch is called a strike rather than a ball. Stunningly, this effect shows up only when it is inexpensive for umpires to do so-that is, when the chance of or penalty for being caught is low. When umpires are reviewed by a computerized monitoring system, no race or ethnicity preference can be detected. Similarly, when the game is well attended, or when the pitch is particularly important, race/ethnicity plays no role in the umpire's evaluation. These effects are robust to a wide set of controls, including 2 fixed effects for each pitcher, umpire, batter and catcher, suggesting that differences in umpire or player-specific characteristics are not driving the results.
In order to quantify the economic significance of these biases better, we shift our focus to the extent to which racial bias by umpires influences game events. Our analysis of at-bat outcomes confirms the previous evidence on individual pitches and generates new insights. For example, given that strikes are more likely to be called when the umpire and pitcher match race/ethnicity, it is tempting to predict that at-bats are more likely to end in strikeouts. Indeed, this is confirmed in the data, but interestingly, called third strikes do not drive the result, which is consistent with the earlier finding that heightened scrutiny of important pitches mutes the expression of umpire bias. Instead, it is swinging strikeouts that are more likely, which suggests that pitchers and/or batters are adjusting their strategies in anticipation of racial/ethnic bias by umpires. Likewise, when the batter puts the ball in play, he is less likely to get a hit. These intriguing results highlight how a small bias in one area of evaluation (i.e., called pitches) can, by causing agents to adjust their strategies, have a substantial impact even when the evaluator's judgment and consequently biases are not directly involved.
Baseball offers several advantages when studying discrimination. First, because every pitch is potentially subject to the home-plate umpire's discretion when it is thrown (several hundred times per game), there is sufficient scope for racial/ethnic discrimination to be expressed as well as for it to affect games' outcomes significantly. In addition, we have a very large number of independent pitch-level observations involving the interaction of four different races/ethnicities: White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian. The data thus allow us not only to explore an umpire's preference for players of his own race/ethnicity, but also to examine preferences between other races/ethnicities, e.g., whether a Black umpire penalizes Hispanic pitchers relative to White pitchers. An additional feature of baseball data is that, unlike other sports where a group dynamic among officials may alter the expression of individual biases, the home-plate umpire is exclusively responsible for calling every pitch in a typical baseball game. 1 The most fortunate aspect of the data set is that it allows us to develop several independent proxies for the scrutiny of the umpire's decisions, and in so doing, to test for the existence of a price-sensitive demand for discrimination by umpires. To be sure, the time period [2004] [2005] [2006] is special because only during this time were a portion of the ballparks outfitted with 1 Umpires can be positioned behind home plate or at first, second or third base. The home-plate umpire (the umpire-3 computers and cameras to monitor umpires' balls and strikes calls. Because umpires are randomly assigned to venues, observing differences in umpire behavior between parks with and without monitoring technology makes a convincing case that properly placed incentives can have the desired effect. These results allow us to not only describe how biases can influence subjective performance valuations, but also to offer prescriptive suggestions to minimize their impact.
Several studies (e.g., Garicano et al, 2005; Zitzewitz, 2006) have examined home-team preferences by referees/judges in sporting events, and another, Stoll et al (2004) examines racial match preferences in employment generally. Our study most closely resembles Price and Wolfers' (2007) work on NBA officiating crews' racial preferences. Although the first part of our empirical analysis corroborates their findings (but for a different sport), we are mainly interested in when racial or ethnic bias is most likely to be observed. Here, we offer two insights. First, we show that discrimination is price-sensitive, so that making it more costly to engage in will reduce its expression. Second, we show that, when quantifying how players are affected by biased performance evaluations, the direct effect is only part of the story. Because players will alter their strategies in response, even situations that are seemingly insulated from a biased evaluator (e.g., non-called pitches in baseball games) are affected. Each of these has policy implications relevant not only for baseball, but for the general labor market as well.
This research adds to a large literature on racial discrimination in sports, specifically in baseball, going back at least to Pascal and Rapping (1972) and Gwartney and Haworth (1974) , with more recent examples being Nardinelli and Simon (1990) , Findlay and Reid (1997) and Bradbury (2007) . It includes studies of such outcomes as productivity, wages, customers' approbation of players, selection for honors, and others. There is some evidence of wage disparities among baseball players of different races, but the results are mixed, e.g., Kahn (1991) .
The conclusions of racial discrimination (or lack thereof) in this literature depend upon each player's productivity being accurately measured, as measured productivity is typically the crucial control variable. We suggest questioning this central assumption: If officials' judgments are themselves subject to racial/ethnic bias, adjusting for differences in the returns to measured productivity will not enable us to obtain proper measures of the extent of discrimination.
The results allow us to think about the deeper question of measuring discrimination generally. If, as we show here, evaluations of workers are affected by the match to the 4 race/ethnicity of their evaluator, then the measured productivity of the worker will depend on the nature of that match. This difficulty has serious implications for measuring discrimination and is another manifestation of the problems in identifying discrimination pointed out by Donald and Hamermesh (2006) .
In the following section we describe the pitch-and game-level data and explain our classification of umpires' and players' races/ethnicities. We then analyze individual pitches in Section III, presenting evidence suggesting that umpires evaluate pitchers who match their own race/ethnicity more favorably than pitchers who do not. In Section IV we show that umpires express these preferences strongly only in times of low-scrutiny-game-and pitch-level situations where monitoring of the umpire is less. We examine the impact of discrimination on the outcome of plate appearances, game outcomes and pitcher performance in Section V. In Section VI we provide robustness checks and consider some extensions to our primary analysis.
Section VII derives the size of the effects of the bias in performance evaluation on the measurement of wage discrimination and applies the results to salaries of baseball pitchers. GameScore, a composite index designed to summarize the starting pitcher's performance. 5 We also obtain the final score of the game, so that we can identify the winning and losing team.
II. Data and Institutions
We next classify each position player, pitcher and umpire who appears in our dataset as 
III. Called Pitches and Umpire-Pitcher Matches
The summary statistics in Table 2 ignore possible differences inherent in the quality or "style" of pitchers by race/ethnicity. They also ignore the possible different outcomes generated by non-random assignment of pitchers to face different opponents, and of umpires to games 7 played by particular teams. 10 To account for these and other potential difficulties, our central test for umpires' discrimination is the specification:
where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a called pitch is a strike, the γ are parameters, ε is a well behaved error term, and i indexes pitches. The main explanatory variable of interest is UPM, an indicator of whether the umpire (U) and pitcher (P) match (M) on race/ethnicity. In almost all of our tests, we include pitcher and umpire fixed effects, so that UPM picks up the marginal effect of a racial/ethnic match between the home-plate umpire and pitcher. That is, because any player or race-specific effects are swept out by the fixed effects, umpires' bias is identified purely via the interaction term, UPM.
In addition to these, we employ a number of important control variables. Pitch-count indicators, which record how many balls and strikes have accrued during a particular at-bat, are crucial because pitchers alter the location of their pitch based on the ball-strike count. Inning indicators are also included, because pitchers are usually less fatigued early in games, and because a pitcher who starts the game is often replaced by a "relief" pitcher in later innings, with a different (often reduced) accuracy. 11 Any home-field bias is captured by top-of-the-inning indicators, which account for whether the home (top=1) or visiting team (top=0) is pitching.
Lastly, we include the pitcher's score advantage (defined as the number of runs, potentially negative, that the pitcher's team is ahead), because, if a pitcher is ahead in the game, he typically pitches more aggressively and is more likely to throw a pitch in the strike zone.
12 Table 3 presents the results of estimating equations where the pitcher and umpire's race/ethnicity are allowed to influence the likelihood of a called strike. All the estimates are based on linear-probability models (but probit estimates present the same picture) with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. We account for any autocorrelation by clustering pitches by pitcher, although this adjustment makes almost no difference. The first three columns 10 Examination of umpires' schedules indicates that while umpires typically travel as a four-person crew throughout much of the year, crews are randomly assigned across teams, ballparks, geography, and league (American or National). Furthermore, umpires rotate in a specific order, i.e., each serves as the home-plate umpire exactly every fourth game, resulting in random assignment of umpires to starting pitchers. 
IV. Called Pitches When Discrimination Is Costly to the Discriminator
One might examine the results in Table 3 and conclude that, while the point estimates are interesting, their statistical insignificance means that there is really little here. Given an economist's view that agents acting out their preferences will react to the price of an activity, however, it is worthwhile to examine the impacts of umpire-pitcher matches as the price of discrimination changes. Our data are particularly well suited to study this question, and it is our primary focus for much of the remaining analysis.
We begin by asking what factors affect the price of expressing racial or ethnic discrimination. Studies of cognitive behavior indicate that presenting the biased party with 9 counter-examples of the stereotype of interest can reduce the severity and/or frequency of the biased behavior (Goodwin et al, 2000; Blair, 2002) . In other words, simply making conscious a sub-conscious bias imposes a sufficient psychological cost to mitigate its expression. Another mechanism is to increase the visibility of the biased party's behavior, potentially exposing the offender to social or statutory penalties. In this section we proxy the price of discrimination by the extent to which an umpire's evaluations of pitchers will be scrutinized, and employ three different measures to examine whether a higher price of discrimination reduces the extent to which umpires engage in discriminatory behavior. evaluate umpires during our sample period. According to the umpires' union's agreement with MLB, QuesTec is the primary mechanism to gauge umpire performance. In particular, if more than 10 percent of an umpire's calls differ from QuesTec's records, his performance is considered substandard, which can influence his promotion to "crew chief," assignment to postseason games, or even retention in MLB.
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Because QuesTec is installed in roughly 35 percent of ballparks, and because umpiring crews are rotated randomly around the league's ballparks, virtually every umpire in our dataset calls a substantial number of pitches in parks both with and without QuesTec. 18 Additionally, both the umpires' and teams' schedules change every year, exposing each umpire to a wide cross-section of batters and pitchers in both QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks. Throughout the analysis we test whether greater scrutiny-the possibly higher cost of indulging in personal discretion in QuesTec parks-leads umpires to call strikes "by the book." Any role that racial/ethnic (or any other) preference plays in influencing pitch calls should be mitigated if the costs of being judged substandard by QuesTec are sufficiently high. Pitchers, however, may act strategically in response to the scrutiny of umpires, altering how they pitch depending on whether the game is in a QuesTec park or not. 19 For this reason, in all of the estimates in this part we include fixed effects not only for each pitcher, umpire and batter, but also for the presence or absence of QuesTec in each game, i.e., pitcher-QuesTec fixed effects, etc. and non-QuesTec parks is significant for both White and non-White pitchers. Table 4 contains the results of estimating (1) separately for QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks, with controls for inning, pitch count, pitcher score advantage, and top of the inning. 20 The results are remarkable: In ballparks with the umpire monitoring system, shown in Column (1), the coefficient on UPM is -0.35 percentage points and is not significantly different from zero. In parks without QuesTec, shown in Column (2), the same coefficient is 0.63 percentage points per pitch (p=.03). These differences make clear why UPM is not significant in the aggregate sample.
The effects found in Table 3 average the statistically significant positive impact of an unscrutinized match (non-QuesTec) with the statistically insignificant negative impact of a scrutinized match (QuesTec). Thus, in the presence of price-sensitive discrimination, we should expect the point estimates in Table 3 to be low, given that the entire sample consists of a mix of high-and low-scrutiny games.
Column (3) of and the "importance" of the pitch.
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The idea for the first is simple. The presence of many fans close to home plate presumably exposes the umpire to their scrutiny-a badly called pitch is unlikely to go unnoticed. 23 Figure 2 confirms that crowd attendance, like QuesTec, dramatically alters umpire behavior. A game is defined as "well-attended" if the crowd attendance is above the median percentage capacity for the sample, roughly 70 percent. Compared to well-attended games, umpires calling poorly-attended games appear to favor pitchers of matched race/ethnicity. In the case of White pitchers, both non-White and White umpires tend to call fewer strikes in poorlyattended games, but the reduction in strikes called by non-White umpires is over three times larger. The same effect is seen to an even greater degree among non-White pitchers. Umpires whose race/ethnicity matches non-White pitchers call nearly 1.5 percent more strikes in poorlyattended games, whereas unmatched umpires call fewer strikes.
In Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A in Table 5 , we show the results of estimating Equation
(1) separately for well-and poorly-attended games respectively. Each equation includes the same 21 Even though the negative effect of a match in a QuesTec park is not statistically significant, what is intriguing is why umpires' decisions might favor unmatched pitchers when they are scrutinized. 22 We scale by stadium capacity in an attempt to minimize the impact of differences between stadium sizes. Specifically, if we assume that stadiums populate relatively uniformly, then attendance/capacity is a good proxy for the number of fans close enough to judge pitch location. In any case, this scaling makes little difference in our results. If we use pure attendance instead, all coefficients of interest remain highly significant.
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battery of control variables employed in Table 4 , i.e., pitcher, umpire and batter fixed effects, pitch counts, inning indicators, clustering by pitcher, etc. As with the QuesTec results, the UPM variable is significant at the 5 percent level only in poorly-attended games, with an effect of 0.68 percentage points per pitch. During well-attended games there is no significant effect of an umpire-pitcher racial/ethnic match and, indeed, the point estimate is negative. Column (3) generalizes the results by aggregating all games and interacting UPM with an indicator for a game being well-attended. Compared to a pitch in a poorly-attended game when the umpire and pitcher do not match, a pitch called by an umpire of the same race/ethnicity as the pitcher is 0.52
percentage points more likely to be judged a strike. If the game is well-attended, a pitch is no more likely to be called a strike if the pitcher and umpire match race/ethnicity. The results for this completely different proxy of the price of discrimination are qualitatively identical to those obtained for the QuesTec vs. non-QuesTec distinction.
A third proxy for the scrutiny of umpires varies many times within each game. We separate pitches into two categories, "terminal" and "non-terminal." A pitch is potentially terminal if the umpire's next judgment can terminate the batter's plate appearance. Specifically, a pitch that is thrown with two strikes and/or three balls is potentially terminal, as a third strike or fourth ball terminates the at-bat. In such situations, the umpire's judgment is likely to be scrutinized more heavily by the pitcher, batter, catcher, managers and fans. An initial glimpse into the effects of this distinction is shown in Figure 3 . Here we observe the same contrast as for the previous two proxies for scrutiny, as umpires appear to favor pitchers with whom they match only in non-terminal counts, when scrutiny is likely to be less.
Columns (4) and (5) of Panel B of Table 5 show estimates of (1) (4) and (5), as the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
In Columns (7) and (8) we consider more within-game variation in implicit scrutiny. We assume that because umpire evaluations are more likely to be pivotal late in games, scrutiny in the first few innings is likely to be comparatively lower. We thus designate the first third (three innings) of a game as "early," and the remainder "late." We expect that a terminal count will have a stronger effect on the outcome of a pitcher-umpire racial/ethnic match in early innings.
Comparing the results across the two columns, we see that this is the case, with the magnitude of the interaction between terminal count and UPM being nearly twice as large in early as in late innings (-1.08 vs. -0.61 percentage points).
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Our proxies for scrutiny are not redundant. The correlation between QuesTec and attendance percentage is near zero, suggesting that these are indeed independent measures of scrutiny. Because the type of pitch (terminal or non-terminal) is a within-game measure, it is necessarily uncorrelated with either between-game measure. It is therefore not surprising that when all three interactions are included simultaneously, everything remains significant. We report the results of this specification, along with other robustness checks in Section VI.
Before proceeding to other issues, we briefly address an obvious question: Are umpires intentionally favoring pitchers of their own race or ethnicity? Although we cannot provide a definite answer, several factors argue for the bias being unconscious rather than conscious.
Supposing for a moment that umpires are aware of their biases, it would be perhaps unsurprising to find that explicit monitoring by QuesTec results in umpires engaging in less discrimination.
However, further assumptions are needed for the implicit measures of scrutiny to have similar effects. Here, umpires must also have in mind a mechanism whereby crowd attendance or pitch importance increases their probability of being discovered, and consciously adjust their behavior in response (pitch by pitch in the case of a terminal count). Moreover, one would expect that umpires consciously attempting to punish or reward pitchers would choose situations where their calls have the most impact on the game. Instead, we find the opposite, i.e., umpires show favoritism only in comparatively unimportant pitches, especially early in games.
14 Of course, our previous analysis suggests that pitch importance proxies simultaneously both the umpire's price of expressing discrimination and the cost or benefit to the pitcher, making it impossible to refute the hypothesis of conscious bias. At the very least, this suggests that the impact of any conscious bias is just as easily eliminated as unconscious discrimination.
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A more plausible hypothesis is that the unconscious bias of umpires is eradicated when they simply exercise more care. The three mechanisms that we study do exactly this, giving umpires strong incentives to make objectively correct calls, inadvertently swamping the effect of any latent bias. In any case, although this distinction is intriguing, the policy implications (either in baseball or employment relationships more generally) remain unchanged: To protect workers from the adverse effects of discrimination, increase the consequences for those that discriminate.
V. Impacts on Game Events
At first glance, the results in Tables 3-5 appear too small to affect the outcomes of atbats, let alone entire games. What is perhaps more surprising, however, is that there is any detectable effect at all. MLB umpires are monitored much more intensively than most workers, even in the "low scrutiny" situations where perhaps only a few thousand people are watching.
The fact that additional scrutiny can still affect behavior reflects the considerable difficulty in eradicating deeply ingrained, inherent biases.
Given these results, however, it is natural to attempt to quantify their economic significance. The dynamic between a pitcher and a batter implies two distinct channels through which an umpire's bias can have influence. The first is direct-if a pitch is more likely to be called a strike, the pitcher has an advantage. For example, all else equal, more called strikes will increase the probability of striking out and/or decrease the probability of walking. The pitchlevel evidence, however, makes very clear that such direct effects are rather small. Of course, one can construct a scenario where the estimated direct effect of bias is fairly large-for nonterminal pitches thrown in the early innings of poorly attended games in parks not equipped with QuesTec, the marginal impact of an umpire-pitcher match on called pitches is nearly 2.5%, compared to an unconditional probability of 31.8%. But in most situations, the direct impact on called pitches is neither the largest nor the most interesting implication of racial/ethnic bias by umpires.
Instead, it is the indirect effects on player strategies that most influence outcomes of plate appearances and games. More specifically, the dynamic between a pitcher and batter is clearly affected by each party's beliefs about the umpire's evaluation in the event of a called pitch. If a pitcher expects favoritism, he will incorporate this advantage into his strategy, perhaps throwing pitches that would have little chance of being called a strike absent the umpire's bias. This in turn changes how the batter will optimally behave. If the batter expects such pitches to be called strikes, he is forced to swing at "worse" pitches, which reduces the likelihood of getting a hit.
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This thought experiment illustrates how even on pitches when the umpire's discretion is not directly involved, the possibility of unfair evaluations can affect behavior and outcomes.
In the Appendix, we develop a stylized model of the interaction between the pitcher and batter. The model produces two important implications relevant for the next set of tests. First, when pitchers expect a racial/ethnic match with the umpire to result in more called strikes, his optimal response is to select pitch locations further from the center of the plate. 27 Intuitively, the umpire's bias reduces the cost of throwing pitches that are difficult for the batter to hit. The second implication follows directly: conditional on swinging, the batter is less likely to get a hit.
Thus the pitcher holds an advantage, not only when balls and strikes are called, but also when the batter swings.
In Table 6 we present two panels where the dependent variables are various possible outcomes for a given plate appearance (the interaction between a pitcher and a batter). In Panel A, we consider how the match variable UPM influences the probability of the batter striking out.
As with previous tests we include the full complement of fixed effects, inning indicators, clustering by pitcher, etc. Column (1) shows that the batter is more likely to strike out by 0.70 percentage points when the pitcher and umpire match race or ethnicity. 26 The intuition for this can be seen by examining the coefficients on the count indicators in Table 3 . When the pitcher has a substantial advantage in the count, he has little incentive to throw a "hittable" pitch, i.e., one near the middle of the plate. Instead, he usually throws pitches near the corners that are both less likely to be hit if the batter swings, and less likely to be called strikes if the batter does not. Such behavior translates into sizeable advantages for pitchers depending on the count. In 2004, batters got a hit 33 percent of the time when the count was 2-1 (two balls and one strike), but dropped to less than 18 percent when the count was 1-2. 27 Chen (2007) presents evidence that justifies this assumption. Specifically, he examines how racial bias affected MLB umpires' balls and strikes calls in one season, as we did for 2004-06 in Section III, but also holding pitch location constant.
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When we break out the type of strikeout, i.e., swinging vs. non-swinging, in Columns (2) and (3), the results are even more interesting. In a swinging strikeout, the batter swings and misses (or barely grazes the ball). In a non-swinging strikeout, the umpire judges a final pitch to be hittable, and the batter is called out. As seen, the impact of UPM on called strikeouts is virtually non-existent, while it remains significant for swinging strikeouts. This distinction both confirms the previous pitch-level results, and it supports the idea that batters are forced to swing at worse pitches.
Recalling that we found no effect of UPM on the probability of a called strike in terminal counts, it would be disturbing to find a significant effect on called third strikes. The fact that we do not is further confirmation that umpires do not display their biases in crucial situations, probably because they expend more care in such situations. Instead, we find that the strikeout effect is completely due to the batter's increased tendency to swing at difficult-to-hit pitches.
The final two columns of Panel A of Table 6 He is either out (e.g., pops out, flies out, fouls out, grounds out, etc.) so that the dependent variable takes a value of zero, or he gets a hit (e.g., single, double, triple, or home run), and the dependent variable is one. Importantly, the sample here (balls put in play) is mutually exclusive to the positive outcomes (strikeouts) in Panel A, so that the same phenomenon is not simultaneously driving both sets of results. That is, it is not the increased likelihood of striking out that causes hits to be less likely.
Column (7) shows that, conditional on putting the ball in play, a hit is 0.33 percentage points less likely when the umpire and pitcher match, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Like the swinging strike evidence, this finding suggests feedback between (in this case biased) umpire evaluations and player strategies. In Columns (8) and (9), we perform the same comparison between QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks, with by now familiar results. While the effect strengthens in magnitude and remains statistically significant in non-QuesTec parks, the effect weakens and becomes insignificant in parks equipped with umpire-monitoring technology.
Quite clearly, the impact of incentives influences not only those situations it is directly designed to monitor, but also those that are indirectly affected.
As a final test of economic significance, we analyze a variety of game-level performance measures for each starting pitcher in our sample: Wins, hits, earned runs, home runs, strikeouts, walks, and GameScore. 28 Some of these, such as hits, walks, and strikeouts, have already been analyzed in Table 6 , but others (e.g., Gamescore, earned runs) are new. Also, for reasons that will soon become clear, we aggregate these performance measures only for starting pitchers, whereas in Table 6 all pitchers in our sample are included. Figure 4 graphs each performance measure for the roughly 14,000 starting pitchers in the roughly 7,000 games in the three seasons in our sample. As in the previous figures, we display the results for White and non-White pitchers separately to highlight the magnified effect of racial/ethnic preference on non-White pitchers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the results in Table 6 , we find that for virtually every measure of pitcher performance the impact of having a matched umpire benefits the starting pitcher. The composite measure, GameScore, is raised for both White and non-White pitchers when the home-plate umpire's race/ethnicity matches theirs. Similarly, both White and nonWhite pitchers allow fewer home runs (HR), hits, runs and walks, and have lower earned-runaverages (ERA), when a match occurs. Only strikeouts (K) among White pitchers do not accord with the observed racial/ethnic preferences by umpires, although the effect is minuscule.
While all of the pitching performance measures are informative, our main interest here is on the most important result in a game-who wins. Looking at the mean game outcomes in various instances of umpire-pitcher matches, the obvious benchmark is the case when both or neither starting pitcher matches the umpire's race/ethnicity. In that case, the home team wins Table 7 we present estimates with the dependent variable equaling one if the home team wins. We include the number of runs scored by the home pitcher's team and specify fixed effects for the pitcher, the umpire and the identity of the opposing team. 30 The coefficient on UPM is marginally significant (p = .07), with a magnitude of slightly over 4 percentage points.
Columns (2) and (3) examine the effect of an umpire-pitcher match on GameScore (with higher values of the dependent variable indicating a better performance) and the number of runs allowed by each starting pitcher (so that both variables are available for both starting pitchers in 29 That these are nearly identical is further evidence of random matching between umpire and pitcher races/ethnicities. a game). 31 The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained on the probability of winningthere is a positive, albeit statistically insignificant benefit to a pitcher's GameScore if he matches the race/ethnicity of the umpire; and there is a marginally significant (p = .11) impact of the pitcher-umpire match on the number of runs allowed, even after adjusting for all the vectors of fixed effects.
In light of the evidence that the effects of an umpire-pitcher match are seen only when scrutiny is less, we can disaggregate the samples underlying the estimates in Table 7 and estimate the equations separately for games played in QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks. Given the small sub-samples and the tightness of the specification with the inclusion of all three vectors of fixed effects, even the estimated effects of an umpire-pitcher match become only slightly more significant when we use the non-QuesTec sub-samples. Nonetheless, for all three dependent variables the impacts of the match are larger in absolute value in these sub-samples than in the sub-samples for QuesTec parks, similar to the at-bat level evidence in Table 6 .
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VI. Robustness Checks and Other Considerations
A. Accounting for Matches with Batters' and Catchers' Race/Ethnicity
It is natural to suppose that an umpire influenced by the race of the pitcher may also be influenced by that of the batter or the catcher, especially since in the latter case the umpire is in continuing close contact. We explore this possibility extensively, but find no evidence to support the argument. As shown in Column (1) of Table 8 , estimating (1) substituting UBM, defined as a racial/ethnic match between umpire and batter, for UPM yields absolutely no effect. A catcherumpire match, indicated by the analogously defined variable UCM, has a small insignificant positive effect on the probability of a called strike, as shown in Column (2). These results are unchanged when all three match variables, UPM, UBM and UCM, are included simultaneously (Column (3) of Table 8) , and, indeed, the coefficients on all three match variables are essentially the same as when each is included separately. 31 The increase in sample size is due to the fact that game-level outcomes are analyzed in Column (1), so that the number of observations is the number of games in our sample. In contrast, the remaining columns consider the performances of each starting pitcher as independent observations, roughly doubling the sample size.
When interactions of UPM, UBM and UCM with QuesTec, high-attendance and terminal counts are included in Equation (1) sequentially, as shown in Columns (4)-(6) of Table 8, each indicator UPM is still statistically significant and positive, and each interaction with UPM is significantly negative. Moreover, none of the main effects of UBM or UCM approaches significance, nor do the interaction terms with those indicators. The results in Column (7), in which all the main-effect and interaction terms are included, give the same picture as the other results: Implicitly umpires engage in discrimination against unmatched pitchers, and each proxy for a higher price of discrimination reduces umpires' demand for discriminatory outcomes.
Umpires appear focused on the pitchers they are judging-there is no evidence whatsoever that matches with other relevant players affect their judgment.
For at least two reasons the absence of any impact of UBM may not be as puzzling at it first appears. First, as suggested above, the per-pitch effect represents racial/ethnic discrimination only relatively infrequently and is concentrated in low-scrutiny situations. Both scrutiny and batters' race/ethnicity change frequently (many times within each game), so any effect may be swamped by the impact of scrutiny. We have no such concerns about statistical power with pitchers, who interact with each umpire over a hundred times within each game under varying degrees of scrutiny. The second possibility is more subtle, owing to the physical proximity of the umpire and batter relative to that of the umpire and pitcher. Psychological studies suggest that, although people may not recognize their own prejudice (Bargh, 1999, Devine and Monteith, 1999) , the risk of being confronted reduces the frequency of biased behavior (Czopp et al, 2006) . If physical proximity to the batter increases the probability of confrontation for an umpire, perhaps it acts as an additional check on the umpire's tendency to express discrimination.
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That there is only a small, insignificant positive effect of an umpire-catcher match, given the proximity of the umpire and catcher for half of each game, may be more surprising. It suggests, however, that umpires realize that they are judging the pitcher. A match with the catcher is less important, and additional interactions of UPM with UCM do not alter the conclusions about the effect of each first-order interaction individually. One can speculate about the absence of a UCM effect, including the possibility that only the pitcher directly faces the umpire, but we cannot distinguish among possible interpretations.
B. Accounting for Umpire and City Characteristics
It may be that umpires' measurable characteristics (beyond their race/ethnicity) and those of the city where a game is played explain our results. We collect demographic information on each umpire from a variety of sources and include his age and experience, and in many cases both his state of birth and residence. For each ballpark we also obtain the racial/ethnic breakdown of the surrounding metropolitan statistical area.
While we find no evidence that the racial composition of an umpire's birthplace or residence predicts his propensity to penalize non-matching players, there is somewhat weak evidence that discrimination is more likely among younger and less experienced umpires. The coefficient on UPM in the re-estimation of Equation (1) among the upper half of umpires ranked by experience is less than half its magnitude in estimates for umpires in the lower half of the distribution of experience. In addition, the 18 "crew chiefs," veterans selected for their seniority and performance, do not appear influenced by the race/ethnicity of the pitcher. Indeed, if (1) is estimated separately for crew chiefs, the point estimate of the coefficient on UPM is nearly zero.
This evidence is consistent with either a model of selection or learning. Perhaps discriminating umpires are not promoted and are dropped from the ranks. Alternatively, experience may teach umpires to restrain their own biases, so that highly experienced umpires are not likely to express racial/ethnic bias in their subjective calls.
We also re-estimated the basic equation for Blacks, and for Hispanics, separately, adding in each case main effects and interactions with UPM of the percentage of the minority group in the metropolitan area where the ballpark is located. Among Blacks the interaction was positive, but statistically insignificant; among Hispanics it was negative, but also statistically insignificant.
Our conclusions are not affected by the racial/ethnic mix of the team's catchment area.
C. Other Issues
The overwhelming majority of minority pitchers are Hispanic. In our main tests, we aggregate them, but some are White Hispanics, while others are Black Hispanics. To allow for the possibility that the two different groups of minority umpires might treat Hispanic pitchers who match their own characteristics differently from other Hispanic pitchers, we visually inspected the Hispanic pitchers' pictures, divided the Hispanic aggregate into White and Black 22 groups and re-defined UPM. This reclassification had almost no effect on the estimates produced in Tables 3-5 . Implicitly, Hispanic and other umpires treat Hispanic pitchers the same regardless of the pitcher's racial identity.
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As the discussion has made clear, there is no objective measure of the quality of a pitch.
We only have information on whether it is called and, conditional on that, if it is called as a ball or strike. It might, for example, be that pitchers, assuming that they will be treated worse if there is a racial/ethnic mismatch, are "rattled" and less likely to pitch strikes. We cannot refute this possibility with certainty, but one might argue that the absence of any mismatch effect on terminal pitches, when this effect would be most likely to prevail, suggests the argument is invalid. Even if it were valid, such a finding would still support the main result, although we would classify it as an "indirect" effect, similar to the effect if a pitcher intentionally altered his strategy in expectation of the umpire's bias.
The estimates in Table 7 would still be unbiased if managers were able to alter their starting pitchers' assignments to take advantage of the umpires' preferences that we have demonstrated exist. Nonetheless, it is interesting to inquire whether managers are implicitly both aware of these preferences and able to act upon them. The racial/ethnic endowments of umpires and starting pitchers in the 7,124 games in our sample would lead one to expect matches in 0.680 of the games. In fact, matches occur in only 0.677 of the games. The difference, aside from being in the unexpected direction, is statistically insignificant (t = -0.69). Quite clearly there is no evidence in our sample of non-random matching of umpires and starting pitchers.
VII. Biases in Measuring Wage Discrimination
In the previous sections we generate some evidence that presumably objective measures of a worker's (in this case, baseball pitcher's) activities can be subtly affected by his evaluator's racial/ethnic preferences, and that this effect in turn leads to reductions in his measured productivity (the game outcomes discussed in Section V). To the extent that pay is based on measured productivity, this finding carries important implications for measuring the extent of discrimination in baseball and in labor markets generally. In particular, it implies that estimates of the extent of discrimination will be understated.
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Consider a simple earnings equation:
where W is the logarithm of earnings, M an indicator of minority status, P* worker i's true productivity, and υ a random error in the determination of earnings. The parameter α is the true effect of minority status on earnings when productivity measurements are free of bias. Assume that the majority workers' productivity is measured without bias, but that minority workers are subject to a negative bias in their assessment by evaluators, which leads to a shortfall of their measured productivity P below their true productivity:
φ>0. Then we can rewrite (2) to obtain an estimating equation in observables:
The standard estimate of earnings discrimination adjusted for productivity differences, α', has a positive bias in the amount βφ.
To obtain some feel for the size of this bias in the particular case that we have examined,
we can simulate the wage effects using the estimates of φ underlying Figure 4 and estimates of β from studies of salary determination in Major League Baseball. We are essentially estimating the reduction in minority pitchers' salaries as a result of the average amount of discrimination arising during the 2004-2006 seasons due to umpire-pitcher racial/ethnic matches. Kahn (1993 ,   Table A2 ) estimates equations like (2') using a set of outcome measures that can be conformed to ours by including the percentage of games won and ERA. Making reasonable assumptions about the means of these outcomes for starting pitchers in 2006, applying the effects in Figure 4 , and using his parameter estimates yields an estimated bias of βφ = 0.039. Gius and Hylan (1996, Table 6 .2) use strikeouts/innings, walks/innings and winning percentage, all of which are also conformable with our outcome measures. The same method based on their parameter estimates produces an estimate of βφ = 0.014. Finally, using the estimates for starting pitchers by Krautmann et al (2003) , the estimate of βφ = 0.084.
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35 For the percentage of games won we use 0.5. The mean ERA is around 4.3, the mean strikeouts/inning by starting pitchers is around 0.7, and the mean walks/inning by them is around 0.3. We can take the estimates of the bias that we have produced as examples here to infer the dollar impacts of this subtle form of discrimination. In 2006 the average salaries of starting pitchers in MLB were $4.8 million. A bias to the estimated effect of minority status on While we have demonstrated the extent of bias to estimated discrimination in earnings that arises because of biased evaluations of Major League Baseball pitchers, this effect is probably smaller than would be observed for workers generally. The scope for the expression of racial/ethnic preferences of umpires for/against pitchers is almost surely far less than in most workplaces. Evaluations of pitchers are made at discrete and very frequent times-when a pitch is thrown. These are not one-shot comments made at most monthly at the evaluator's leisure.
Also, as our demonstrations of reduced bias when there is greater scrutiny suggest, there are quite stringent external limits on the expression of bias against unmatched pitchers. The relative lack of such limits in the general workplace suggests that the example here may provide a lower bound on the extent of bias to estimates of discrimination generally. The costs to the economy may be still higher: Analogous to our demonstration of pitchers' changed behavior in the face of umpires' discrimination, one might expect that workers who believe that they will be discriminated against in evaluations respond by altering their behavior in ways that reduce economic efficiency generally.
VIII. Conclusions
The analyses of individual pitches and game outcomes suggest that baseball umpires express racial/ethnic preferences in their decisions about players' performances. Pitches are more likely to be called strikes when the umpire shares the race/ethnicity of the starting pitcher, an effect that only is observable when umpires' behavior is not well monitored. The evidence also suggests that this bias is strong enough to affect pitchers' measured performance and games' outcomes. As in many other fields, racial/ethnic preferences work in all directions-most people
give preference to members of their own group. The difference in MLB, as in so many other fields of endeavor, is that power belongs disproportionately to members of the majorityWhite-group.
The type of discrimination that we have demonstrated is disturbing because of its implications for the sports labor market. In particular, non-White pitchers are at a significant disadvantage relative to their White peers, even in the absence of explicit wage discrimination by teams. Although some evidence suggests such explicit discrimination exists, i.e., there is a wage compensation of starting pitchers of between 1 and 8 percent suggests that those pitchers are underpaid relative to White pitchers by between $50,000 and $400,000 per year. gap among baseball players of different races, the fact that over 90 percent of the umpires are White implies that the measured productivity of non-White pitchers may be downward biased.
Implicitly, estimates of wage discrimination in baseball that hold measured productivity (at least of pitchers) constant will understate its true size.
More generally, our results suggest caution in interpreting any estimates of wage discrimination stemming from equations relating earnings to race/ethnicity, even with a large set of variables designed to control for differences in productivity. To the extent that supervisors' evaluations are among the control variables included in estimates of wage discrimination, or even if they only indirectly alter workers' objective performances, their inclusion or their mere existence contaminates attempts to infer discrimination from adjusted racial/ethnic differences in wages. If racial/ethnic preferences in evaluator-worker matches are important, standard econometric estimates will generally understate the magnitude of racial/ethnic discrimination in labor markets.
While the specific evidence of racial/ethnic match preferences is disturbing, our novel analysis of the demand for discrimination should be encouraging: When their decisions matter more, and when evaluators are themselves more likely to be evaluated by others, our results suggest that these preferences no longer manifest themselves. These findings imply that it should not be difficult for MLB to devise methods to eliminate the impacts of racial/ethnic match preferences. 36 Clearly, raising the price of discrimination in the labor market generally through analogous methods is more difficult; but these results may suggest measures that might have the desired effects.
The Batter's Problem:
To determine whether he swings at a pitch with expected location µ, the batter compares his expected payoff from swinging,
with that from not swinging, The intuition for Lemma 1 is straightforward. Batters will not attempt to hit pitches that have very little chance of being called a strike should they not swing, i.e., for sufficiently low values of .Moreover, the cutoff for swinging ˆ is a function of the payoffs S, B, H, and N that correspond to the possible outcomes of the plate appearance. Generally, these payoffs will depend on game conditions, such as the score, the count, runners on base, or other factors that determine the payoffs to each outcome. For example, with runners on second and third base but no outs, the benefit of a hit (H) is substantial, where the cost of hitting into an out (N) is relatively small. In this situation, the batter will be less selective at the plate, which increases the swinging cutoff ˆ. We do not model differences in these payoffs across plate appearance, although the present set-up easily allows for this extension.
Our main interest is in how changes in the conditional strike function, s( ), influence the batter's optimal behavior. Specifically, assume that the race/ethnicity match of the umpire and pitcher influences the probability that a pitch aimed at location µ will be called a strike. If the pitcher and umpire match (M), denote the conditional called strike probability ) ( 
In other words, the same pitch has a different probability of being called a strike, conditional on whether the umpire and pitcher have the same or different races or ethnicities. Lemma 2 indicates that when the batter anticipates judgments that favor the pitcher, his optimal strategy changes. Expecting the umpire's bias to reduce his payoff from not swinging, the batter takes matters into his own hands by swinging at pitches that he would otherwise let pass.
Empirically, this implies a distinct advantage to the pitcher, not only for pitches that are called, but also for pitches that are hit. We complete this exercise by extending consideration to the pitcher's optimal strategy.
The Pitcher's Problem:
The pitcher's choice variable is , the expected location of the pitch. His expected payoff is the inverse of the batter's. If the batter swings, then the pitcher's expected payoff is -h(µ) H-[1-h(µ) The model's main prediction is that the umpire's bias influences not only called strikes and balls, but also pitches where the umpire's judgment plays no direct role. Lemma 3 shows that the umpire's judgment influences the choice of pitch location, which in turn influences the batter's incentive to swing at the ball. It follows that conditional on swinging, the batter is less likely to hit the ball when the umpire and pitcher share race or ethnicity. As indicated by the model, this is because pitches are, on average, more difficult to hit in these situations. This table presents regressions of outcomes of plate appearances by batters. Panel A considers the specific outcome of striking out. In Column (1), the dependent variable in an indicator that takes a value of one for all strikeouts, whereas in Columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable takes a value of one only for "called" and "swinging" strikeouts, respectively. In swinging strikeouts, the batter either swings and misses on the final third strike or fouls into the catcher's mitt. In called strikeouts, the batter does not swing, but the umpire calls a final third strike. Columns (4) and (5) consider the effect of swinging strikeouts in parks equipped (not equipped) with QuesTec, a system of cameras intended to rate the umpire's performance. Panel B considers a larger family of outcomes. In Column (6), the dependent variable is whether the batter walked. In Column (7), the dependent variable is whether the batter gets a hit or not, conditional on having put the ball in play. In Columns (8) and (9), the same specification in Column (7) is considered separately for QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks. UPM is an indicator of whether the umpire and pitcher match on race/ethnicity. All specifications include the same set of control variables shown in High Attendance is an indicator of whether a pitch is thrown in a game with above-median percentage attendance.
Terminal Count is an indicator of whether a pitch is thrown in a terminal count, i.e., a count with three balls or two strikes, such that the umpire's judgment can potentially end the at-bat. All columns include the same set of control variables shown in Table 3 -the indicators for inning, count, pitcher score advantage and the top of the inning. All columns also include fixed effects for each pitcher-QuesTec, umpire-QuesTec, and batter-QuesTec combination. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Umpire Pitcher Match GameScore is a composite index designed by Bill James to summarize the starting pitcher's performance. K represents the number of strikeouts by the starting pitcher, HR is the number of homeruns allowed by the pitcher, and ERA is the pitcher's earned run average. 
